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Global Financial Crisis and Systemic Risks    
in the Korean Banking Sector
by Myung-koo Kang
Introduction
Financial crises are more common than people usually expect. In fact, 139 
ﬁ nancial crises from 1973 to 1997 have been identiﬁ ed by Eichengreen and 
Bordo,1 and they concluded that the frequency of the crises is increasing 
although these crises are not necessarily becoming more severe. Recently, 
Laeven and Valencia ﬁ led a data set covering 124 systemic banking crises 
from 1970 to 2007,2 and Reinhart and Rogoff also convincingly showed, 
based on a long-term historical database for the past eight centuries, that 
international debt and banking crises, currency crises, and defaults have been 
a very common, historical phenomena.3 Most countries have passed through 
various types of external debt crises as their ﬁ nancial sectors become more 
liberalized and integrated into the global ﬁ nancial markets.4
Since World War II, however, the current global ﬁ nancial crisis has been un-
matched in its scope and depth of negative impacts on the global economy.5
Advanced economies are going through the deepest recession since World 
War II, and the crisis is spilling over to emerging and developing countries.6
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the global economy 
will shrink for the ﬁ rst time since World War II during the coming year.7 In 
particular, accelerated ﬁ nancial deleveraging8 has had immediate impacts on 
global demand, and it is posing serious challenges to the global economy, 
regardless of the soundness or “fundamentals” of each national economy. 
Currently, deleveraging is posing a serious challenge to the export-driven 
East Asian economies,9 and the Korean economy is no exception.
Various ominous economic indicators have created a sense of foreboding: if 
the crisis is not managed well, the current Korean economic situation could 
escalate into a much more serious crisis than the ﬁ nancial crisis Korea had 
to go through a decade ago during the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis. Since the last 
quarter of 2008, when the ﬁ nancial turmoil originating from the subprime 
mortgage problem in the United States came to be a full-blown global crisis 
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 September, both exports 
from and imports to Korea have rapidly decreased, while macro ﬁ nancial 
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instability has been increasing. The gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
rate of Korea—one the lowest growth rates among OECD countries—shrank 
to –5.6 percent from the preceding quarter.10
The Korean ﬁ nancial markets are suffering from massive ﬁ nancial de-
leveraging by foreign investors as well. As a symptom of this ﬁ nancial 
deleveraging, the Korean currency has sharply depreciated—one of the 
highest depreciation rates among major currencies—and is ﬂ uctuating 
against the U.S. dollar. Among others, two factors currently pose a concern 
for the potential for a systemic banking crisis in Korea: (1) a remarkably 
increasing short-term foreign debt,11 especially from 2006 onward; and (2) 
the highly leveraged banking sector joined by household debt that rose to 
158 percent of disposable household income by the end of 2008, which is 
above the U.S. level (142 percent) and close to that in the United Kingdom 
(185 percent).12 What, then, went wrong in the Korean case?
The above question may be unfair if the intention is to ﬁ nd a political 
scapegoat responsible for the current situation because the current global 
ﬁ nancial crisis originated not from Korea but from the epicenter of the 
global ﬁ nancial markets, the U.S. ﬁ nancial markets, owing to the credit 
and asset bubble accelerated through the securitization of various ﬁ nancial 
derivatives.13 We may also reasonably claim that the Korean economy, 
including other emerging markets, is suffering regardless of the soundness 
of its economic fundamentals. Furthermore, policy measures by the Korean 
government against the current economic downturns are constrained by the 
pace of restoring stability in the global ﬁ nancial markets and the upturn 
swing of the business cycle of the global economy. Questions on this issue 
are, however, reasonably raised in order to learn policy lessons to prevent 
or at least minimize the cost of systemic banking crises in the future.
In this paper, I argue that, despite the Korean government’s tremendous 
achievement in transforming the country’s depressed ﬁ nancial markets into 
more globalized and open ones, the ﬁ nancial deregulation measures pursued 
by the government for the past decade have increased the vulnerability 
of the Korean banking sector to external shocks. Speciﬁ cally, the Korean 
government has aggressively attempted to deregulate foreign exchange, 
both inward and outward capital ﬂ ows, while the Korean currency has not 
been fully internationalized; and the government has allowed the reckless 
practices of short-term foreign borrowing by domestic branches of foreign 
banks without establishing an appropriate monitoring system. The cur-
rent situation demands a new regulatory framework that can prudentially 
supervise the ﬁ nancial system, not only for promoting efﬁ cient ﬁ nancial 
intermediation of cross-border capital ﬂ ows and the soundness of individual 
ﬁ nancial institutions but also for managing the systemic risks of the entire 
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ﬁ nancial system. This regulatory reform will certainly be a challenging task 
under the increasingly globalized ﬁ nancial intermediation, not only for the 
Korean government but also for other governments in the world. Moreover, 
the current ﬁ nancial crisis highlights that the highly leveraged, external bor-
rowing model of economic growth cannot be sustained as before.
Discussion will proceed, ﬁ rst, by reviewing the sharp currency depreciation 
and the outﬂ ow of foreign investors’ portfolio investment from the Korean 
stock market especially. We will then explore the reasons for the increasing 
short-term foreign debt and household debt in the banking sector by review-
ing the ﬁ nancial deregulation measures adopted by the Korean government 
in regard to foreign exchange and banking activities. Last, some lessons and 
policy implications will be discussed.
Immediate Impacts of Global Financial Crisis on Korea
Sharp Currency Depreciation
One of the most immediate impacts of the current global ﬁ nancial crisis on 
Korea has been reﬂ ected in the sharp depreciation of the Korean currency. 
The real effective foreign exchange rate of the Korean won depreciated much 
more sharply than the currency of any other OECD country in 2008.19 The 
Japanese yen has been the most appreciated currency against U.S. dollar 
for the past year, and it has appreciated approximately 20 percent. Half of 
the currencies of OECD countries have appreciated and half depreciated. In 
the case of the Korean won, it depreciated about 28 percent in 2008. Except 
for Iceland, which has declared national default during the current global 
ﬁ nancial crisis, the Korean won depreciated the most among the currencies 
of OECD countries.
Even when we compare the degree of currency ﬂ uctuation among Asian 
currencies, speciﬁ cally before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Broth-
ers on 15 September 2008, we can observe a similar pattern: the Korean 
exchange rate has depreciated more sharply than any other Asian currency 
(Figure 1). The Hong Kong dollar and Singapore dollar have depreciated, 
but their range of ﬂ uctuation was minimal. The Malaysian ringgit and Thai 
baht depreciated as well, but both these currencies depreciated less than 10 
percent compared with their previous levels. The Indonesian case is much 
worse, and the rupiah has depreciated more than 20 percent. But the Korean 
won has depreciated more sharply than the Indonesian rupiah.
Why has the Korean won been so vulnerable during the current global 
ﬁ nancial crisis?20 An immediate conventional answer to this question is 
the high degree of trade dependency of the Korean economy. In fact, the 
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Korean economy in 2008 suffered on account of the aggravating terms of 
trade, and both exports and imports have decelerated, in particular, since the 
fourth quarter of 2008. But, because imports have decelerated more rapidly 
than exports, the current account balance did not severely worsen earlier. 
Instead, the overall size of Korea’s trade volume has rapidly decreased in 
accordance with the declining global demand (Table 1). 
Figure 1. Comparison of Fluctuation of Currencies of Selected Countries 
January 2008–January 2009 Range  (% of currency ﬂ uctuation)
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Source: Bank of Korea. http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.
It is true that Korea achieved rapid economic growth in the past by promot-
ing exports. In 1961, exports totaled only $40 million, but exports reached 
more than $375 billion in 2007. Thus, Korea’s exports have increased more 
than 9,000-fold during the past 46 years. The country’s export growth has 
been amazing, but the growth has become a structurally vulnerable aspect 
of the Korean economy as well. Owing to the current global ﬁ nancial crisis, 
external demand has sharply decreased, and the Korean economy is suffer-
ing. More speciﬁ cally, the Chinese market has emerged as Korea’s single 
largest export market since 2002, replacing the U.S. market, and Korean 
exports to the European Union (EU) have been greater than its exports 
to the U.S. market since 2005. In 2007 about $100 billion in goods and 
services were exported by Korea to Hong Kong and mainland China. In 
total, exports to four major regions and countries—China, Japan, the EU, 
and the United States—make up more than 60 percent of Korean exports. 
Therefore, if these economies suffer, Korean exports will decrease, and the 
Korean economy will suffer.
Export dependency or an export-oriented economic structure, however, can-
not explain the exceptionally vulnerable situation of the Korean economy 
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Table 1: Korea’s Imports and Exports, January 2008–January 2009 
in billions of U.S. dollars
Source: Bank of Korea. http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.
2008
/01
2008
/02
2008
/03
2008
/04
2008
/05
2008
/06
2008
/07
2008
/08
2008
/09
2008
/10
2008
/11
2008
/12
2009
/01
Current account balance –2.75 –2.35 –0.11 –1.58 –0.37 1.82 –2.53 –4.69 –1.35 4.75 1.90 0.86 –1.63 
Imports 
(by use) 
Total 36.3 32.6 37.1 38.3 38.7 37.8 42.9 40.4 39.5 36.1 28.8 26.6 24.7 
For
domestic 
21.6 19.5 22.1 23.1 22.6 21.6 24.4 22.9 22.0 21.9 18.0 17.8 15.9 
For export 14.7 13.1 15.0 15.2 16.1 16.2 18.5 17.5 17.5 14.2 10.8 8.8 8.8 
Exports 
Total 32.3 31.2 36.0 37.8 39.4 37.3 40.9 36.6 37.4 37.1 28.8 27.1 21.3 
United
States
3.65 3.35 4.08 4.23 3.87 4.21 4.14 3.54 3.83 4.43 3.49 3.49 2.63 
Japan 2.33 2.25 2.41 2.49 2.52 2.59 2.61 2.20 2.29 2.44 2.07 1.99 1.53 
China 7.26 6.43 8.33 8.64 8.91 8.71 8.96 8.53 8.09 7.46 5.29 4.71 4.46 
Hong Kong 1.36 1.32 1.67 1.82 1.74 1.78 2.20 1.73 1.81 1.70 1.53 1.07 1.11 
under the current global ﬁ nancial crisis. If we compare the trade-to-GDP 
ratio among OECD countries in 2006, for example, trade’s contribution to 
Korea’s GDP is about 85 percent, a middle range of trade dependency. Other 
small- or medium-size European countries such as Finland, Sweden, Poland, 
Switzerland, and Denmark also have a similar or high trade dependency ratio. 
But these countries have not suffered like Korea, at least so far. In Asia, the 
exports-to-GDP ratios of Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand (Indonesia is not 
addressed here) are higher than that of Korea.21 Therefore, trade dependency 
cannot explain entirely why the Korean economy is suffering more than 
other economies during the current global ﬁ nancial crisis. We need to ﬁ nd 
more direct reasons from the ﬁ nancial sector, and one plausible answer 
to the sharp currency depreciation lies in the ongoing massive ﬁ nancial 
deleveraging in the Korean ﬁ nancial markets.
Deleveraging in Foreigners’ Portfolio Investment
Financial deleveraging is going on at the global level.22 It began with the 
subprime mortgage problem in the United States in mid-2007 and then 
accelerated, especially after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-
September of 2008. It ﬁ rst spread to advanced economies in which the 
ﬁ nancial markets are more closely integrated to the U.S. ﬁ nancial markets. 
Banks in advanced economies have cut overseas lending to emerging and 
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developing countries.23 Korean ﬁ nancial markets have also been heavily hit 
by foreign investors’ retreating from their portfolio investment to Korea.
Table 2 shows the overall trend of inﬂ ow and outﬂ ow of capital in Korea 
from 1998 to 2008. As the table shows, in 2008 more than $50 billion of 
investment ﬂ owed outward from Korea. This massive withdrawal occurred in 
every type of foreign investment: foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio 
investment, ﬁ nancial derivatives, and in the category of other investments. A 
notable aspect is that the balance of portfolio investment started to decrease 
beginning in 2005, even before the current global ﬁ nancial crisis. In 2006, 
the balance of portfolio investment (inﬂ ow minus outﬂ ow) was $23.2 bil-
lion in deﬁ cit, and the deﬁ cit was larger in 2007—$26.0 billion. During the 
past three years, the deﬁ cit of portfolio investment has increased more than 
$64 billion in total. The balance of FDI has remained in the minus column 
since 2006 as well.  
Table 2: Balance of Financial Account in Korea, 1998–2008
in billions of U.S. dollars
Source: Bank of Korea. http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.     
* This category is mostly composed of foreign borrowing: the banking sector played a major 
role in foreign borrowing.
Despite the sharp increase of deﬁ cits in these categories, the overall balance 
of ﬁ nancial account was in surplus before 2008. The deﬁ cits in portfolio 
investment and FDI were offset by the remarkable surplus in the balance 
of the category of other investments, which is mostly composed of banks’ 
overseas short-term borrowing. We can see the remarkable increase in the 
category of other investment between 2006 and 2007—$48.3 billion and 
$43.9 billion, respectively—and then the sharp downturn in 2008—$10.6 
billion deﬁ cit. The majority of the inward surge of foreign capital was me-
diated by loans from abroad, as Table 2 shows; and banks—in particular, 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Financial account total –3.368 2.430 12.725 –2.660 7.338 15.308 9.352 7.097 21.098 9.516 –50.895
Balance of foreign direct 
investment
0.673 5.136 4.285 1.108 –0.224 0.100 4.588 2.010 –4.540 –13.836 –10.595
Balance of portfolio investment –1.224 9.190 12.177 6.706 0.346 17.287 6.599 –3.518 –23.230 –26.058 –15.367
Balance of financial derivatives –0.654 –0.513 –0.179 –0.123 0.362 0.619 2.020 1.790 0.484 5.445 –14.333
Balance of other investment* –2.162 –11.382 –3.557 –10.351 6.854 –2.699 –3.856 6.815 48.384 43.965 –10.600
Loans from abroad –1.508 –13.455 –4.858 –13.208 1.934 –5.032 –0.935 1.022 44.180 41.968 –19.582
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branches of foreign banks—have played a pivotal role in such ﬁ nancial 
intermediation since 2006.
What happened in 2006? As we will see in a later section, starting in 2006, 
overseas bank borrowing was stimulated in Korea in part by rising inter-
est rate differentials relative to other countries, notably Japan. In addition, 
forward sales of dollars to local banks by Korean shipbuilders with long-
term contracts reportedly prompted overseas borrowing by those banks to 
cover their exchange rate risk. This increasingly freer inﬂ ow and outﬂ ow of 
foreign capital has become possible because of the aggressive liberalization 
measures on foreign exchange by the Korean government.
This balance of ﬁ nancial account, however, does not show the scale of 
ongoing ﬁ nancial deleveraging originating from the decrease in investment 
by foreign investors. We need to speciﬁ cally explore the trend of inward 
foreign investment for that purpose. Table 3 shows the overall trend of the 
stock of foreigners’ investment in Korea from 2001 to 2008. We can observe 
that the stock of foreign investment rapidly increased—$248.8 billion to 
$826.3 billion—from the end of 2001 to the end of 2007. Since then it has 
decreased rapidly. In 2008, $225.0 billion was withdrawn from the Korean 
ﬁ nancial markets. In particular, we can see that foreigners’ portfolio invest-
ment was the major driving force of this withdrawal trend. The stock of 
portfolio investment increased more than fourfold from $106.4 billion in 
Table 3: Foreign Investment into Korea, 2001–08, Outstanding Claims of 
non-residents, in billions of U.S. dollars
Source: Bank of Korea. http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total volume 248.8 277.2 337.8 413.5 539.4 652.3 826.3 601.3 
Foreign direct investment 53.2 62.7 66.1 87.8 104.9 115.8 122.0 85.3 
Portfolio investment 106.4 116.2 165.0 210.3 310.5 352.4 456.7 251.7 
Equity securities (stocks) 70.0 75.7 116.8 156.4 249.5 276.4 320.1 124.7 
Debt securities (bonds) 36.4 40.5 48.3 53.9 61.0 76.0 136.6 127.1 
Financial derivatives 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.3 2.4 4.9 14.3 
Other investment 88.8 97.4 105.8 114.5 122.8 181.7 242.8 250.0 
Loans 67.3 73.2 73.8 74.0 75.6 122.8 162.9 145.8 
Banks 34.2 41.3 46.1 47.0 51.2 96.2 135.4 115.0 
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2001 to $456.7 billion by the end of 2007. It then started to decrease rapidly 
in 2008, as the subprime mortgage problem in the United States became 
more aggravated. About $205.0 billion of foreigners’ portfolio investment 
has been drained from the Korean ﬁ nancial markets; reduction of foreign-
ers’ investment in equity securities (stocks) was the major portion of the 
withdrawal, about $195.4 billion.
For the past decade, owing to the increase in foreigners’ portfolio invest-
ment, the total value of the Korean stock market grew by approximately 450 
percent from 2001 to the end of 2007. In 2001, the total value was about 
246 trillion won, and it reached its peak in October 2007 at approximately 
1,126 trillion won. During this period, foreign investment in the Korean 
stock market also rapidly increased. At the peak in 2005, foreign ownership 
was more than 42 percent. Since then, the ratio of foreign ownership has 
decreased gradually.
A notable aspect is the origin of foreigners’ portfolio investment. The in-
vestment proportion of U.S. and EU investors in total portfolio investment 
by foreigners has exceeded 70 percent since 2002. Currently, the U.S. and 
the European economies are suffering greatly on account of the ongoing 
ﬁ nancial crisis, and major foreign investors from the United States and 
Europe have withdrawn their investments from emerging and developing 
markets. The Korean ﬁ nancial markets have been one of the main sources 
of such withdrawals (Table 4).
This surge of portfolio investment can be interpreted as a positive process 
of ﬁ nancial deepening in which the overall size of capital markets has been 
rapidly expanded and more integrated into the global ﬁ nancial markets. A 
Table 4: Origins of Foreigners’ Portfolio Investment in Korea, 2002–08
in billions of U.S. dollars
Source: Bank of Korea, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total (A) 116.2 165.0 210.3 310.5 352.4 456.7 252.3 
United States + 
European Union 
(B)
United States 59.6 76.4 96.6 142.2 146.0 162.3 71.5
European Union 30.9 47.1 58.2 91.8 115.1 173.2 94.1
Subtotal (B) 90.49 123.48 154.79 234.03 261.07 335.51 165.58 
Ratio (B)/(A)   78% 75% 74% 75% 74% 73% 66%
Japan (C ) 
Amount 4.2 5.2 6.9 6.9 8.5 12.6 9.7
Ratio (C)/(A)   3.6% 3.1% 3.3% 2.2% 2.4% 2.8% 3.8% 
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decade ago, when the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis occurred, a main source of inward 
foreign capital ﬂ ow was a loan type of capital ﬂ ow. The volume of inward 
portfolio investment by foreign investors was at a minimal level owing to 
the long history of Korean government regulations on foreign exchange. By 
February 1997, for example, when the revised Foreign Capital Inducement 
Law came into effect, FDI projects had to be declared to the government 
and get its approval. Therefore, the fact that Korea exceeded more than $800 
billion of inward foreign capital within a decade means that there has been 
a drastic change—a “quantum jump”—in the Korean ﬁ nancial markets. It 
is also true, however, that the Korean ﬁ nancial markets have suffered more 
under the current global ﬁ nancial crisis because of the speedy deregulation 
on foreign exchange.
Financial Vulnerability in the Banking Sector
Various factors have contributed to the current massive deleveraging by 
foreigners from the Korean ﬁ nancial markets, but two aspects of the ﬁ nan-
cial vulnerability of the Korean banking sector are notable: one is the rapid 
increase of short-term foreign debt beginning in 2006, and the other is the 
increasing household debt.
Sharp Increase of Short-term Foreign Debt
For the past decade, gross foreign debt has increased about 2.3 times—from 
$163.8 billion to $380.5 billion in 2008 (Table 5). During the same period, 
short-term foreign debt has increased from $39.5 billion to $151.0 billion, 
and its proportion in the gross external debt has also increased. However, 
foreign currency reserves increased rapidly as well—from $51.9 billion 
in 1998 to $200.4 billion at the end of 2008. Currently, foreign currency 
reserves exceed short-term foreign debt.
The recent rise of short-term foreign debt differs considerably from the pre-
crisis rapid increase of short-term foreign debt Korea experienced before the 
Asian ﬁ nancial crisis. First of all, foreign exchange reserves are still larger 
than the total short-term foreign debt. At the end of 1997, short-term foreign 
debt amounted to $70 billion—three times as much as the country’s total 
international reserves—and the ratio of short-term debt accounted for 67 
percent of total foreign debt.24 The current situation is much better than the 
situation a decade ago. Second, a large portion of foreign debt is attributable 
to loans extended against future foreign currency revenues, so-called bridge 
ﬁ nancing. For example, exporters such as shipbuilders hedge the related 
exchange rate risks by selling forward exchange contracts. It is estimated 
that about 36 percent of foreign debt has been incurred by shipbuilders’ 
currency hedging or other types of bridge ﬁ nancing, which are free of re-
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payment burdens, or other types of bridge ﬁ nancing to minimize the future 
risks of the foreign exchange rate.25 Third, the Korean government made 
$30 billion worth of currency swaps with the U.S. government at the end 
October of 2008,26 and it has also expanded the currency swap amounts with 
Japan and China.27 Considering these factors, we can reasonably claim that 
the risk of maturity mismatch between foreign currency assets and liabilities 
remains not as serious as most people worry about, and an immediate cur-
rency crisis is not expected.
Of note, however, is the pattern of increasing short-term foreign debt. 
Short-term foreign debt increased abruptly after 2006. From Table 5, we 
can observe that short-term foreign debt increased sharply during 2006 and 
2007—from $65.9 billion to $160.2 billion. Out of this short-term foreign 
debt, foreign loans made up the major portion. Banks have played a pivotal 
role in channeling short-term-oriented loan types of foreign borrowing. As 
Table 5 shows, immediately after the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis in 1998, short-
term foreign loans decreased more than $20 billion. Since then, short-term 
foreign loans have not substantially increased at all. But, they sharply in-
creased in 2006 and 2007. During these two years, banks borrowed about 
$74.4 billion at short-term—$41.3 billion in 2006 and $33.1 billion in 2007. 
Then, short-term foreign loans started to decrease in 2008.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Gross
external
debt
Total 163.807 152.936 148.119 128.687 141.471 157.394 172.259 187.882 260.061 383.152 380.495
Short terma
39.580
(24.2%)
43.058
(28.2%)
49.657
(33.5%)
40.293
(31.3%)
48.179
(34.1%)
50.805
(32.3%)
56.348
(32.7%)
65.911
(35.1%)
113.748
(43.7%)
160.249
(41.8%)
151.056
(39.7%)
Long term 124.227 109.879 98.462 88.394 93.291 106.589 115.912 121.971 146.312 222.903 229.439
Annual
Increase of 
Foreign 
Borrowing 
(Loan 
Type) 
Total -1.508 -13.455 -4.858 -13.208 1.934 -5.032 -0.935 1.022 44.180 41.968 -19.582 
Long-term 19.107 -16.093 -3.899 -9.005 -3.147 -5.099 -4.230 -4.702 1.739 7.507 2.438 
Short-term -20.615 2.638 -0.959 -4.203 5.082 0.067 3.295 5.724 42.440 34.461 -22.020 
 Banks -12.250 5.528 -1.804 -3.193 6.162 0.226 4.071 5.728 41.316 33.137 -22.418
Foreign currency reservesb
51.972
(32.2)
73.700
(21.7)
95.855
(22.1)
102.48
(6.6)
120.814
(18.3)
154.508
(33.6)
198.175
(43.6)
209.967
(11.7)
238.387
(28.4)
261.770
(23.3)
200.479
(–61.2)
Table 5: Gross External Debt, Annual Foreign Borrowing, and Foreign 
Currency Reserves in Korea, 1998–2008, in billions of U.S. dollars
Source: Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/)    
a.Percentages in this row show the ratio of short-term debt compared with the total gross ex-
ternal debt.         
b. Percentages in this row show the annual change of foreign currency reserves.
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Who, then, accumulated all those short-term foreign loans? It was not banks 
in general, but the branches of foreign banks that played a signiﬁ cant role 
in channeling short-term foreign borrowing. As Table 6 clearly shows, out-
standing short-term foreign borrowing mediated by domestic branches of 
foreign banks more than doubled from end 2005 to end 2006—$23.3 billion 
to $51.8 billion—and the gross amount of short-term foreign borrowing 
through the branches of foreign banks started to exceed that of domestic 
banks beginning in 2006. It reached almost $80 billion by the end of 2007 
and started to decrease in 2008 (see Table 6).
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Banks Total (A) + (B) 72.506 67.627 61.464 51.300 58.471 67.728 74.491 83.429 136.536 192.880 171.720
Domestic banks (A) 53.638 49.867 45.168 37.440 39.244 45.339 50.574 58.388 82.113 108.959 99.394
Short-term 15.052 18.633 22.910 17.807 21.012 21.083 23.454 27.969 44.259 54.642 45.243
Long-term 38.586 31.233 22.259 19.632 18.232 24.256 27.120 30.419 37.854 54.317 54.151
Domestic branches of foreign
banks (B) 
18.868 17.760 16.295 13.860 19.227 22.389 23.918 25.041 54.422 83.921 72.325
Short-term 16.063 15.124 14.430 12.410 17.142 19.692 20.996 23.307 51.835 79.345 67.736
Long-term 2.805 2.636 1.865 1.450 2.085 2.697 2.922 1.734 2.588 4.576 4.590
Source: Bank of Korea, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.
The Korean government has claimed that this foreign borrowing by domestic 
branches of foreign banks cannot be regarded as a genuine foreign debt; 
instead it can be regarded as transactions within the foreign banks, between 
the mother bank in a foreign country and the subsidiary branch bank in 
Korea.  But all that borrowed money from foreign ﬁ nancial institutions 
must have been provided to domestic economic actors (banks, ﬁ rms, and 
individuals); and, if domestic branches of foreign banks want to withdraw 
their loans from the Korean markets, those borrowers in Korea should pay 
back the debt. It may have a signiﬁ cant impact on the economy. Therefore, 
regardless of the channels of foreign borrowing, this huge amount of short-
term debt must be a burden to the Korean economy at the moment.
This trend highlights that there exists a widening gap between increasing 
cross-border ﬁ nancial transactions and the ﬁ nancial regulatory frameworks 
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that have been consolidated according to national boundaries. This phenom-
enon demands new fi nancial regulatory frameworks at both the global and 
national levels. Such frameworks might have to be constructed through a 
painful “muddling through” process of political bargaining and coordination 
in the current Group of Twenty summits and other global meetings.
Leveraged Banks and Household Debt
During the past decade, the Korean banking sector grew rapidly, not only in 
total asset size but also in fi nancial intermediation.29 Accordingly, Korean 
banks have increased their money supply about fi vefold, from approximately 
200 trillion won in 1998 to more than 917 trillion won by the end of 2008.30 A 
notable recent feature, however, is that Korean banks have rapidly increased 
loan provision by borrowing. Starting in 2004, the total loans provided by 
banks exceeded the total deposits of banks—deposit-to-loan ratio—and this 
gap has widened very rapidly since 2004. At the end of 2008, the gap was 
more than 240 trillion won (Table 7). 
Banks have issued bonds to mobilize additional money for lending. For 
example, the total amount of bank bonds issued up until January 2001 was 
approximately 51 trillion won, but the amount doubled by mid-2005, and 
y
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total loan
 (A) 
200.289 250.240 310.804 357.384 471.684 538.261 565.655 613.923 699.430 803.724 917.110 
 
All 
industry 
144.768 171.114 201.859 199.773 249.353 284.504 289.329 308.409 353.208 440.043 528.537 
Manu-
facturing 
69.201 78.076 87.801 86.061 99.192 105.591 109.838 117.703 127.471 149.837 187.251 
Household 
(C) 
55.522 79.126 108.945 157.611 222.331 253.757 276.327 305.514 346.222 363.681 388.573 
(C)/(A) 27.7% 31.6% 35.1% 44.1% 47.1% 47.1% 48.9% 49.8% 49.5% 45.2% 42.4% 
Total deposits 
(B) 251.794 323.411 404.660 455.630 512.419 548.098 540.726 561.945 592.720 593.171 675.204 
Ratio (A)/(B) 79.5% 77.4% 76.8% 78.4% 92.1% 98.2% 104.6% 109.2% 118.0% 135.5% 135.8% 
s and 
Discounts
Table 7: Loans and Discounts by All Banks in Korea, 1998–2008
in trillions of Korean won
Source: Bank of Korea, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.
Note: All banks comprises commercial banks and specialized banks.
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then it doubled again between mid-2005 and 2008, reaching about 227 
billion won.31 This increasing amount corresponds with the widening gap 
between total deposits and total loans in the banking sector. This is a very 
signiﬁ cant change in modern Korean banking history because, since the 
beginning of Korea’s modern banking in 1909, Korean banks have never 
before provided more loans than the total amount of deposits.32 
These rapidly increasing loans have been channeled more to households, 
in particular to housing-related sectors. Total loans provided to the house-
hold sector by ﬁ nancial institutions have increased almost fourfold during 
the past decade, from 165.8 trillion won in 1998 to 648.3 trillion won; in 
particular, loans provided by commercial and specialized banks have in-
creased more rapidly—from 55.5 trillion won to 388.5 trillion won during 
the same period. As Table 8 shows, commercial and specialized banks have 
played a pivotal role in providing loans to the household sector. By the end 
of 2008, the total amount of household loans surpassed by more than two 
times the entire amount of lending provided to the manufacturing sector. 
Around 2005 and 2006, almost half of all bank loans were provided to the 
household sector. Simply put, we can say that retail banking has been much 
strengthened during the past decade.
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total loans to households (A) 165.8 191.9 241.0 303.5 391.1 420.9 449.3 493.4 550.4 595.3 648.3
Depository corporations 
(B)
115.1 133.4 157.6 206.0 276.9 322.0 355.5 393.2 443.3 474.0 515.9
(B)/(A) 69.4% 69.5% 65.4% 67.9% 70.8% 76.5% 79.1% 79.7% 80.5% 79.6% 79.6%
Commercial and 
specialized banks (C)
52.9 76.3 107.2 156.7 222.0 253.7 276.3 305.5 346.2 363.6 388.5
(C)/(A) 31.9% 39.8% 44.5% 51.6% 56.8% 60.3% 61.5% 61.9% 62.9% 61.1% 59.9%
Housing-related 
loans — — — — — — — 208.4 240.9 245.7 254.7
Security against 
housing (D) — — — — — 
152.5 169.2 190.2 217.1 221.6 239.6
(D)/(C) — — — — — 60.1% 61.2% 62.3% 62.7% 60.9% 61.7%
Loans and discounts to the 
manufacturing sector (by 
commercial and specialized 
banks) 69.2 78.0 87.8 86.0 99.1 105.5 109.8 117.7 127.4 149.8 187.2
Table 8. Credit to Households in Korea, 1998–2008
in trillions of Korean won
Source: Bank of Korea, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/.
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Why, then, have households borrowed more from banks? Rising debt re-
ﬂ ects a number of factors, including falling real interest rates on loans to 
households and the expanded use of credit cards. In addition, the decline 
in borrowing by large Korean conglomerates (chaebol) as they reduced 
debt levels following the 1997 crisis prompted banks to expand lending 
to households as well as to small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). 
However, one of the most important reasons lies in the fact that people bor-
rowed more money to purchase houses and then used houses as collateral 
to receive additional loans from banks. In fact, as Table 8 shows, more than 
half of household loans were secured by houses as collateral. The percentage 
of housing-related loans has constantly exceeded more than 65 percent of 
total bank loans, and the percentage of security against housing has gener-
ally been exceeding more than 60 percent.
This high ratio of housing-related loans was closely linked with the housing 
bubble from 2001 to 2006. In 2002, for example, the annual change in the 
purchase price of apartments was more than 22 percent. Under the circum-
stances, if people—as rational economic actors—could borrow money with 
far lower interest rates from banks, they would have borrowed money and 
invested in the housing markets. The Korean government noticed the risk 
of increased household loans in the banking sector, housing-related loans in 
particular: “During 2005–07, the Korean government introduced ﬁ ve policy 
packages that imposed price ceilings on new apartments, reduced the price 
of publicly built housing, raised taxes on capital gains and property hold-
ing, and limited bank lending for mortgages.”33 The government introduced 
various restrictions to channel loans less to the household sector and more 
to the corporate sector, especially to SMEs. In consequence, banks have 
provided more loans to SMEs, and SME borrowing increased from 317.6 
trillion won in the ﬁ rst quarter of 2007 to 421.7 trillion won by the end of 
2008—increased more than 22 percent. Meanwhile, real estate prices have 
stabilized since 2007. As of 2008, mortgages account for 40 percent of 
household liabilities in Korea, much lower compared with the U.S. and UK 
shares of around 75 percent, and it makes Korean households and banks less 
vulnerable to a decline in housing prices. But, because of the preemptive 
government intervention to restrain the housing bubble, the stock of unsold 
homes reached a record high in 2008. In the ﬁ rst half of 2008, new housing 
starts fell more than 50 percent from a year earlier.
Currently, Korean individuals are vulnerable to credit tightening as they 
have a low savings rate and high leverage—a debt-to-income ratio of 142.5 
percent. Table 9 shows that total ﬁ nancial assets in the individual sector 
substantially decreased in 2008. Net ﬁ nancial transaction ﬂ ow, which in-
cludes the volume of ﬁ nancial assets resulting from stock price changes 
or exchange rate changes, has decreased more than 167 trillion in 2008. In 
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consequence, individuals’ ﬁ nancial debts have much increased while their 
net ﬁ nancial assets have greatly shrunk. The high level of debt has already 
made a signiﬁ cantly negative impact on private consumption, and it poses 
a downside risk, as it is affecting private consumption.34 Household inter-
est payments climbed from 6 percent of disposable income in 2004 to 9 
percent in 2007, despite declining interest rates. Most ﬁ nancial debt is at 
variable rates, shifting risk from ﬁ nancial institutions to households. The 
high leveraging of the household sector makes it more vulnerable to the 
global credit crunch. What makes the situation worse is that simultaneously 
the household savings rate has plunged. It declined from an average rate 
of 20 percent during the 1990s to only 2.2 percent in 2002 although it has 
rebounded modestly since the collapse of the credit card bubble in 2002 and 
2003.
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Financial assetsa (A) 1,234.2 1,400.9 1,521.8 1,712.8 1,677.4 
Flowsb 78.4 166.7 120.8 191.0 –35.4 
Transaction flows 67.4 91.2 126.7 123.2 131.6 
Net transaction flowsc 11.0 75.5 –5.9 67.9 –167.1 
Financial debtsc (B) 542.4 601.4 670.1 743.0 802.0 
Net financial assets (A–B) 
691.8 
(8.8)d
799.5 
(15.6)
851.7 
(6.5)
969.8 
(13.9)
875.3 
(–9.7)
Table 9: Trend of Net Financial Assets of the Individual Sector, 2004–08
in trillions of Korean won
Source: “Flow of Funds during 2008 (preliminary),” Bank of Korea, March 2009.
a. Excluding commercial trade credits and miscellaneous ﬁ nancial assets (debts).
b. Changes in volume during the year.
c. Changes in volume of ﬁ nancial assets resulting from stock price changes or exchange rate changes.
d. Figures in parentheses respresent changing ratio from the preceding year-end.
Eventually, deleveraging in the household and the corporate sector will weaken 
household consumption and corporate investment. In particular, economically 
weak actors such as SMEs and low-income households will be much more 
vulnerable to the economic downturn than large ﬁ rms—the chaebol—which 
have accumulated internal funds in case of hostile merger and acquisition 
activity since the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis. The longer the current credit crunch 
lasts, the longer the SMEs and low-income households can expect to experi-
ence severe trouble. Accordingly, the Korean government needs to take bold 
and decisive supportive measures to encourage banks to extend credit to 
individuals and SMEs. Up to now, the Korean government has responded to 
the economic slowdown with a broad range of policy measures, including 
macroeconomic stimulus packages35 and monetary easing measures,36 similar 
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to what most governments have adopted since the full-blown escalation of 
the current global ﬁ nancial crisis in the last quarter of 2008.
Post-crisis Financial Liberalization and Government Failure
All these systemic risks in the banking sector have originated from not only 
external shocks but also the regulatory failure of the government. While 
liberalizing the inward and outward capital ﬂ ows, the Korean government 
has not fully recognized the potential risks that foreign bank branches will 
pose as cross-border ﬁ nancial intermediation is fully liberalized. Systemic 
regulatory measures have not been introduced appropriately to supervise 
the ﬁ nancial intermediation activities of branches of foreign banks. In ad-
dition, the Korean government was in a rush to increase the size of foreign 
exchange markets by liberalizing the capital account and the outmoded way 
of defending the foreign exchange rate, but the Korean currency has not 
yet been fully internationalized. This situation has promoted speculative 
attacks on the Korean currency and increased ﬁ nancial vulnerability to the 
current global ﬁ nancial shock.
Regulatory Failure on Domestic Branches of Foreign Banks
Since the ﬁ nancial crisis in 1997, the Korean government has ambitiously 
tried to transform the Korean ﬁ nancial markets into the “hub” of Northeast 
Asia by 2011. The government has liberalized foreign exchange transactions 
aggressively. Major measures include internationalizing the won, liberalizing 
overseas investment, easing restrictions on capital transactions, developing 
the foreign currency market, and relaxing the obligation to prove external 
credits. These measures have made a signiﬁ cant impact on the rapid rise 
of short-term foreign debt, mostly channeled by domestic branches of for-
eign banks since 2006, and the increasing deﬁ cit in the balance of portfolio 
investment since 2004.
Immediately after the ﬁ nancial crisis in late 1997, the Korean government 
accepted IMF conditionality in return for receiving a $57 billion package 
of support from the IMF. Following the conditionality, the newly inau-
gurated Kim Dae-jung administration (1998–2002) launched a two-stage 
liberalization plan for all foreign exchange transactions in June 1998. The 
ﬁ rst stage of liberalization lasted from April of 199937 to the end of 2000, 
and during this initial liberalization the government shifted regulations on 
capital account transactions from a positive system into a negative one. The 
permission requirement was lifted except in the cases of transactions for 
which permission was stipulated by law or decree. Domestic corporations 
were allowed to borrow money with maturities of less than one year directly 
from foreign ﬁ nancial institutions. Foreigners were allowed to make deposits 
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and open trust accounts denominated in Korean won if such transactions 
had maturities of more than one year. Notably, a long-held principle of “real 
demand” for forward and derivatives transactions was abolished.
The second stage of liberalization took effect in January 2001. It further 
accelerated capital account liberalization, mostly lifting the regulations on 
currency account transactions by both domestic individuals and foreigners. 
In particular, the obligation of repatriation of overseas claims was eased. In 
April 2002, the Korean government announced the Plan for the Development 
of the Korean Foreign Exchange Market, which includes the full liberaliza-
tion of regulations on foreign exchange. As a ﬁ rst step toward implementing 
the plan, the Korean government eased the procedural regulations concerned 
with individuals’ external payments, permitted securities companies and 
insurance companies to participate in the interbank foreign exchange market, 
and liberalized the export of the Korean won beginning 2 July 2002.
The succeeding Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–07) accelerated this 
ongoing liberalization under the ambitious plan of transforming Korea into 
a ﬁ nancial hub for Northeast Asia by 2009, two years ahead of the initial 
plan of the Kim Dae-jung administration. In June 2005, the government 
announced an Overseas Investment Activation Plan in order to solve the 
problem of excess foreign exchange supply and promote corporate expansion 
overseas. Accordingly, the government abolished the ceiling on overseas 
ﬁ nance or insurance business investment by nonﬁ nancial institutions and 
increased the limits on real estate acquisition abroad and overseas direct 
investment by individuals. The turning point was the year of 2006. In 2006, 
the government changed the remaining permission requirements for capital 
transactions, according to a Foreign Exchange Liberalization Plan, to dec-
laration requirements and enacted additional measures to promote overseas 
investment. Consequently, outward FDI and portfolio investment increased 
greatly, causing capital ﬂ ight (see Table 2). Under the circumstances, 
branches of foreign banks have expanded their cross-border ﬁ nancial inter-
mediation, targeting interest rate differentials, by borrowing short-term loans 
from the global ﬁ nancial markets and providing them to domestic economic 
actors that might have limited access to foreign borrowing (Table 6).
The problem was, however, that the government did not introduce an appro-
priate supervisory framework for the activities of the branches of the foreign 
banks. Instead, loose regulatory rules have been applied to those branches. 
In contrast, the Korean government has applied strict regulations on liquidity 
risk management and internal management to domestic ﬁ nancial institu-
tions participating in foreign exchange markets. For instance, Article 64 of 
the Regulation on Supervision of Banking Business, enacted in April 1998 
for the ﬁ rst time and amended most recently in May 2007, stipulated that 
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domestic ﬁ nancial institutions have to maintain a liquidity ratio in foreign 
currency following certain speciﬁ c standards.38 In addition, Articles 65 and 
67 stipulated the rules for management funding resources for medium- and 
long-term loans in foreign currency and internal management standards to 
cope with risks—such as country risk, large credit risk, ﬁ nancial derivatives 
transaction risk, market risk—arising from foreign exchange transactions. 
However, Article 68 of the regulation explicitly stipulates that these provi-
sions shall not be applied to domestic branches of foreign banks. Instead, 
the regulation stipulates in detail about the operating funds of foreign bank 
branches: for example, Article 10, Item 7, stipulates that “Foreign bank 
branch shall submit to the Governor relevant documents such as details of 
funding and refunding, contracts, and conﬁ rmation letter of fund transfer 
with respect to Interofﬁ ce Long-term Borrowing.”39
There are no regulations on short-term foreign borrowing. In addition, 
foreign bank branches are required to report their operating funds monthly 
(Article 10, Item 5). Furthermore, the Banking Act, wholly amended in 
January 1998, stipulates in Articles 58 to 63 the relevant rules for domestic 
branches of foreign ﬁ nancial institutions, but there are no speciﬁ c regulations 
on the operations of these branches except the application of provisions on 
capital stock, which shall be governed by presidential decree (Article 63). 
In short, there are no speciﬁ c rules or regulations that can properly monitor 
and supervise the real-time, short-term capital ﬂ ow by domestic branches 
of foreign banks in Korea.
Foreign Exchange Rate Policy: A Leaning-against-the-Wind Strategy
With the successive liberalization measures on foreign exchange, the average 
amount of daily trading in the foreign exchange markets has expanded. For 
example, the daily average turnover of total foreign exchange transactions 
including interest and currency derivatives in the Korean foreign exchange 
market increased from $9.1 billion in 2002 to $46.5 billion in 2007.40 In 
particular, forward trading has increased 43 percent per year on average 
since 2002. This increase has largely resulted from the fact that export-
related companies and asset management companies, dealing with foreign 
securities investment, have increased their forward selling to hedge foreign 
exchange rate risks.41
Note, however, that the Korean won is mainly traded in the nondeliverable 
forward (NDF)42 markets. The Korean won NDF market was “the largest 
and most liquid NDF market globally” in the period 2003–04.43 The reason 
has been generally attributed to the fact that the Korean government, un-
like most other Asian governments, allows domestic banks to operate in 
the NDF market. As a part of foreign exchange control, access to onshore 
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forward markets by nonresidents is not allowed in China and Taiwan.44 By 
April 2006, the interdealer market daily trading volume of the Korean won 
amounted to $2 billion, which was the largest trading volume in the Asian 
NDF markets (Table 10).
Country Contract tenures 
Asian interdealer market 
daily trading volume 
(millions of U.S. dollars) 
Trade size 
(millions of U.S. 
dollars)
Bid-ask
spread 
(basis points) 
Korea Liquid to 2 years, limited liquidity 
3–5 years 
2,000 10 2 
Taiwan, 
ROC
Liquid to 12 months, limited 
liquidity up to 5 years 
1,000 5–10 2–4 
China Liquid to 12 months, limited 
liquidity 3–5 years 
700 10 3–5 
India Liquid to 12 months, limited 
liquidity up to 5 years 
500 5–10 3–5 
Malaysia Moderate liquidity up to 12 months, 
illiquid beyond 
450 5 10–12 
Indonesia Moderate liquidity up to 12 months, 
illiquid beyond 
250 3–5 10–20 
Philippines Moderate liquidity to 12 months, 
limited liquidity 3–5 years 
250 3–5 7–9 
Table 10: Turnover and Liquidity in Asian Nondeliverable Forward Markets
Source: Jacob Gyntelberg, Guy Debelle, and Michael Plumb, “Forward Currency Markets in 
Asia: Lessons from the Australian Experience,” BIS Quarterly Review (September 2006): 59.
Note that Asian NDF contracts are traded in over-the-counter (OTC)45 and 
offshore markets. As NDF markets are OTC, it is difﬁ cult to gauge the 
volume of contracts traded and learn who trades. This nature of the NDF 
markets implies that speculative demands are strongly present, in addition to 
real hedging demand, in the Asian NDF markets. According to a survey by 
the Committee on the Global Financial System work group under the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), as much as 60 to 80 percent of NDF 
volume is generated by speculative interest, reﬂ ecting growing participa-
tion from international hedge funds.46 Speciﬁ cally, more than three-quarters 
of all trades in the Asian NDF markets are traded through the interdealer 
network, unlike the markets for major currencies, which are traded mostly 
through interbank transactions.47 Moreover, trading of the Asian NDF 
markets predominantly take place in Singapore and Hong Kong, followed 
by London and Tokyo.48 These markets are beyond the regulatory control 
of certain governments. Therefore, there exist two risks for those countries 
seeking to keep short-term capital movements under control while relying 
on NDF markets: “One risk is that pressures for appreciation or depreciation 
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may ﬂ ow from the NDF market to the spot market by making capital ﬂ ows 
larger and more volatile. A second risk is that NDF markets may make it 
easier for sizeable speculative positions to build up.”49 
NDF transactions had been on the increase since they were liberalized 
in April 1999 as part of foreign exchange liberalization. The outstanding 
amount of net NDF purchases by nonresidents reached $10.8 billion by the 
end of 2006.50 However, this volume is much smaller than the increasing 
volume of foreign exchange derivatives in Singapore and Hong Kong. From 
2004 to 2007, for example, average daily turnover of OTC foreign exchange 
derivatives in Singapore increased from $91 billion to $153 billion, and in 
Hong Kong during the same period it increased from $70 billion to $143 
billion.51 Moreover, the overall size of the Korean foreign exchange market 
is only a very small part of the global foreign exchange markets. As Table 
11 shows, the daily average turnover on the Korean exchange market is 
very small. Its share in the global foreign exchange market was about 0.8 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Amount % share Amount % share Amount % share Amount % share 
United Kingdom  637  32.5  504  31.2  753  31.0  1,359  34.1  
United States  351  17.9  254  15.7  461  19.2  664  16.6  
Japan  136  6.9  147  9.1  199  8.2  238  6.0  
Singapore  139  7.1  101  6.2  125  5.2  231  5.8  
Hong Kong SAR  79  4.0  67  4.1  102  4.2  175  4.4  
France  72  3.7  48  3.0  64  2.6  120  3.0  
Germany  94  4.8  88  5.5  118  4.8  99  2.5  
Korea  4  0.2  10  0.6  20  0.8  33  0.8  
Taiwan, ROC 5  0.3  4  0.3  8  0.3  15  0.4  
China*  0  0.0  0  0.0  1  0.0  9  0.2  
Thailand  3  0.2  2  0.1  3  0.1  6  0.2  
Malaysia  1  0.1  1  0.1  2  0.1  3  0.1  
Philippines  1  0.1  1  0.1  1  0.0  2  0.1  
Total  1,969  100  1,616  100  2,429  100  3,988  100  
Table 11: Distribution of Foreign Exchange Market Turnover   
in billions of U.S. dollars and percentage
Source: Triennial Central Bank Survey 2007 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements, Decem-
ber 2007), table B.2, www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07t.pdf?noframes=1.
Note: Distribution of foreign exchange market turnover is shown for daily average in April 
2007. 
* For 1998, 2001, and 2004, spot transactions only.
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percent in April 2007, surveyed by the Bank for International Settlements, 
although the absolute volume of daily turnover increased very rapidly from 
$4 billion 1998 to $33 billion in 2007. Nonetheless, the volume is much 
smaller compared with the volumes of Singapore and Hong Kong.
Under the circumstances, the new Lee Myung-bak administration has 
adopted a leaning-against-the-wind strategy in managing Korea’s foreign 
exchange rate.52 Initially the new administration preferred a weak won for 
export promotion while oil prices were skyrocketing and terms of trade 
were being aggravated in the ﬁ rst half of 2008. Then the Korean govern-
ment switched its foreign exchange rate policy to defend the won at ap-
proximately 1,000 won to the U.S. dollar while depreciation pressures were 
going up on account of the escalating global ﬁ nancial crisis. Because of this 
inconsistent policy position, speculative attacks on the Korean currency 
in the offshore NDF markets seem to have been rampant. After only 10 
months of the establishment of Lee Myong-bak adminitration in February 
of 2008, foreign exchange reserves decreased more than $61 billion (Table 
5). A majority portion of the decreased foreign exchange reserves seems 
to have been spent uselessly for defending Korea’s foreign exchange rate 
from speculative attacks.
Concluding Remarks
Financial crises are endemic to ﬁ nancial liberalization, but they also lead to 
reforms to address problems. The current global ﬁ nancial crisis originated 
from—and at the same time revealed—the structural vulnerabilities of 
globalizing ﬁ nancial transactions in both their internal and external dimen-
sions. From a broader historical point of view, the current ﬁ nancial crisis 
challenges the relevance of the past ﬁ nancial liberalization model, in which 
appropriate supervisory functions of the government have not kept pace 
with the speed of development of new ﬁ nancial derivatives in the ﬁ nancial 
markets. Predicting the consequences of an unﬁ nished crisis is perilous, 
but it is already clear that, even in the absence of a calamity, the direction 
of ﬁ nancial globalization and ﬁ nancial regulation will change.
Those systemic risks in the Korean banking sector have not  developed 
into a systemic banking crisis due to both government’s preventive bold 
measures and relatively less turbulent foreign market conditions. But it 
is evident that the Korean banking sector, and the Korean economy more 
broadly, is still placed in a difﬁ cult position owing to declining global 
demand and increasing ﬁ nancial instability. The timing of the substantial 
economic rebound depends on an improvement in the world economy, 
which is almost beyond the capacity of the Korean government. Nonethe-
less, the current situation demands that the government needs to sustain 
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its bold and swift actions to minimize ﬁ nancial vulnerability and an exit 
strategy should be implemented in a gradual and prudent way. Of course, 
the mounting public debt can be a burden to the economy, but Korea is 
not the only case suffering from mounting public debt. In fact, the Korean 
case is still relatively moderate in terms of public debt. For instance, the 
IMF projects that the gross public debt of the ten richest countries of the 
Group of 20 will reach 106% of GDP by the end of 2011, up from 78% in 
2007.  It means that more than $9 trillion of extra debt will be accumulated 
in three years.  The IMF also predicts that the government debt of the rich 
ten countries will hit 114% of GDP by 2014.53
The current global ﬁ nancial crisis demonstrates that an abrupt withdrawal 
of government regulation from markets is not an appropriate way of coping 
with ﬁ nancial globalization and liberalization. To date, the Korea ﬁ nancial 
sector is still far behind the ﬁ nancial sectors of advanced economies, not 
only in scale but also in the quality of ﬁ nancial services. Nonetheless, the 
Korean government needs to take a gradual and cautious approach in de-
regulating foreign exchange and other ﬁ nancial practices; it needs especially 
to strengthen the prudential monitoring functions of the government over 
the activities of foreign banks in Korea. The current ﬁ nancial instability 
in Korea’s foreign exchange highlights that matching the sequence and 
speed of deregulation is of crucial importance in the institutional design of 
ﬁ nancial liberalization. Moreover, the systemic risks in the Korean banking 
sector demonstrate that a preexisting regulatory framework focusing on the 
soundness of individual ﬁ nancial institutions needs to be shifted to manage 
the systemic risks of the entire ﬁ nancial system. Furthermore, the current 
global ﬁ nancial crisis highlights that the highly leveraged, external borrow-
ing model of economic growth cannot be sustained as before.
Last, the current crisis raises an issue of how far the balance between the 
government and markets should shift. The remarkable economic growth in 
Korea for the past decades, along with other economic growth in East Asia, 
has provided a development model: the state can engineer high economic 
growth with equity. In particular, the current crisis will inevitably intensify 
political and social conﬂ icts in regard to the cost sharing of the economic 
downturns. It will likely be a thorny political issue and, therefore, will de-
mand decisive and compassionate political leadership. But a more genuine 
challenge that the Korean society is facing is to develop an alternative 
model of development that fosters reasonable levels of social cohesion 
and communal values in accordance with more market-oriented reforms to 
dismantle the past state-driven economic system. We need to pay attention 
to not only economic recovery from the current crisis but also the social, 
political, cultural—and ultimately human—dislocations that will result from 
the current ﬁ nancial meltdown.
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